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The Enforcement of International Criminal Law:
Fact or Fiction?
by Robert A. Friedlander*
To the famous question posed by Professor Georg Schwarzenberger
more than three decades ago as to whether or not an international
criminal law really exists,' a definite answer, subject to certain qualifica-
tions, can now be given. There is an international criminal law-recog-
nized by many different countries and self-contained legal systems in one
form or another, applicable to a variety of proscribed activities of one
type or another, regulated by numerous treaties and conventions seeking
to establish one specific standard or another. Particular goals on the in-
ternational criminal level are in fact easily identified, but claims on behalf
of an established order are as yet premature.
Non-English speaking scholars and publicists seem to prefer the
term international penal law, and a difference in emphasis exists not only
in terminology but also in focus. Indeed, a distinction can be made be-
tween the common law approach and that of its European counterparts.
Common law concerns, when given international application, are likely
to center upon substantive criminality, while civilian and socialist per-
spectives are aimed at penalty and punishment. This is not to say that
the requirements of procedure or process are either ignored or omitted,
but rather that serious difficulties are bound to arise when there is an
attempt to combine adversarial with accusatorial principles.
To borrow from the words of Professor Bos: "How indeed is one to
devise any notion at all responsible for the elaboration. . . of an entire
legal order?" 2 The two most obvious examples which indicate the diffi-
culties and the potentialities of an international criminal law are the long
debated, but no longer awaited, international criminal court and the re-
* Professor of Law, Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University; J.D. (1973), DePaul
University College of Law; B.A. (1955), Ph.D. (1963), Northwestern University; Member, Advisory
Board of this Journal. This article is a follow-up to an article published in an earlier volume of this
Journal. See Friedlander, The Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present Day Inquiry,
15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 13 (1983).
1 Schwarzenberger, The Problem of International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEG. PROBS. 263
(1950), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3-36 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965) [here-
inafter cited as INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
2 G. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1983) (quoting
Professor Bos).
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cently proposed, already controversial international criminal code. It is
now almost sixty years since the International Law Association first sug-
gested the creation of an international criminal court, which the world
community has been debating at various intervals ever since.3 A major
obstacle-as yet, an insuperable one-is the role of any international
criminal tribunal in a direct enforcement system. The history of public
international law over the past three and a quarter centuries has demon-
strated clearly and convincingly that direct enforcement in a community
of mutually competing and unequal sovereignties has rarely occurred.
When it has been imposed at all-let alone in a juridical sense-it has
been imposed by sovereign states cooperating for a specific purpose,
either on the basis of mutual assistance or through adherence to treaty
and convention.'
I. BACKGROUND
Proposals for an international criminal code first began in this cen-
tury with those of Professor Quintiliano Salddna at the Hague lectures in
1925' and then by Professor Vespasian Pella in a seminal study published
the very next year.6 Despite the Nuremberg Judgment, the Nuremberg
Principles,7 the Genocide Convention,8 and the Apartheid Convention,9
to name only a few relevant instruments, there has been no discernible
movement from within the world community to construct an operative
international criminal code. The most recent endeavor to draft a mean-
ingful document has been that of Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, Secre-
tary-General of the International Association of Penal Law (IAPL), who
reshaped a number of contributions by selected experts from that same
organization.'o
3 See B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD
PEACE-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1980). The most recent proposal, along sim-
ilar lines, was that of an international skyjacking court put forward by U.N. Secretary-General U
Thant in a little noticed and less remembered speech of September 14, 1970 commemorating the
25th anniversary of the United Nations. See 8 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, 1968-1971, at 472 (A. Cordier & M. Harrelson eds. 1977).
4 Regional enforcement systems, particularly the one associated with the European Court of
Human Rights, are a special case and outside the scope of this analysis.
5 1 B. FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 42-43.
6 Id. at 43.
7 28(a) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in 2 B. FERENCZ,
supra note 3, at 236-39.
8 Convention on The Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Genocide
Convention].
9 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 30
Nov. 1973, 18 U.N.T.S. 3.




The Bassiouni Code, as it has come to be called within the confines
of the IAPL, was first submitted to the United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders held at Caracas during
August 1980. It was then resubmitted, for additions, corrections, and
modifications to a seminar of the Association of International Penal Law
which met at Siracusa, Italy, in May 1982. The latter participants in
effect agreed to disagree with the strongest criticism and opposition com-
ing from, surprisingly, the European members.11 At present the Code
appears to be in a state of legal limbo until the designated working
groups can work out their differences.
A criminal or penal statute in and of itself, let alone an international
criminal code, is at best an indirect enforcement model. Yet, enforce-
ment remains the name of the game, or to put it in terms of a famous
common law maxim, a law badly enforced is worse than no law at all.12
But enforcement of what and against whom? At this moment in time the
focus is blurred, due in part to the dichotomy developing between penal-
ists and publicists.
Is there a tendency when drafting an international code, especially
in writing criminal statutes, to criminalize internationally that which is
merely domestic criminality? Or to put it another way, are there crimes
purely municipal which have been criminalized on the international level
because they are outrageous acts when viewed in a world community
context?13 Should the projected code codify that which is already agreed
upon or criminalize conduct over which there is vast disagreement? Is
the emphasis to be primarily criminal or to be primarily international?
International criminal law fundamentally deals with human wrongs and,
therefore, its mirror image is the international protection of human
rights. Is, in fact, the identification of internationally protected human
rights analogous to the codification of criminally proscribed international
11 See Le projet de Code Pdnal International: commentaires, 52 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DRorr PENAL 331 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Code commentaires].
12 Cf G. VAN HooF, supra note 1, at 116: "A rule that is repeatedly violated in practice...
will eventually lose its legal character."
13 International Terrorism, for which there is still no generally accepted definition, constitutes
the best example. The global debate over the nature and consequences of terror-violence appears to
be endless. See for example, the latest Report of the Secretary-General, Measures to Prevent Inter-
national Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental
Freedoms and Study of the Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence
which lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Causes Some People to Sacrifice
Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, U.N. Doc. A/38/355
(1983). A somewhat positive view of U.N. approaches to the Global terrorist challenge can be found
in J. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE: A
LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 180-99 (1982). Contra Green, The Legalization of Terrorism, in
TERRORISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 180-91 (Y. Alexander, D. Carlton & P. Wilkinson eds. 1979).
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conduct?14
II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The concept of an international criminal law contains a variety of
paradoxes. 1" One of the most perplexing relates to the responsibility of
states. It is common wisdom that states, although they are the major
subjects of international law, cannot be held to criminal liability: "The
state as an international person cannot be held criminally liable because
there is no criminal responsibility without guilt, and the state as a
whole . . . cannot be placed in the dock ... ."16 For the twentieth
century, and arguably throughout modern history, state violence has
been the major catalyst for international change. Estimates range as high
as ten million civilian casualties alleged to have occurred from the count-
less political conflicts of the post-charter era.' 7
A. State Aggression
Not surprisingly, therefore, from the very first draft international
criminal code proposed by the Interparliamentary Union in October
192518 to the recent Bassiouni Code,' 9 state aggression is placed at the
head of the list of proscribed international conduct. The United Nations
twenty-fifth anniversary Declaration on Principles of International Law
bluntly proclaims: "A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the
peace, for which there is responsibility under international law."2 The
General Assembly's Definition of Aggression, passed by consensus in De-
cember 1974 after more than a quarter century of debate and disagree-
ment, repeats in article 5, section 2, the prior prohibition: "A war of
aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to
international responsibility."'" Article 19 of the International Law Com-
14 Cf. Nanda, International Crimes under the Draft International Criminal Code: A Commen-
tary in Code commentaires, supra note 6, at 427-38; Lombois, Observations sur l'avant-projet de Code
Pinal International et rapport final sur les d'ebats du seminaire international de l'Institut de Syracuse
sur l'avant-projet in Code commentaires, supra note 11, at 531-43.
15 Mueller, International Criminal Law: 'Civitas Maxima, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 6
(1983).
16 B. JANKOViC, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-49 (1984).
17 'Small Wars' Penetrate New Corners of Map, The Blade (Toledo), July 17, 1983, D, at 1, col.
5; cf, A World at War, The Chicago Tribune, June 28, 1983, § 4, at 22, col. 4 (a more conservative
survey focusing on the past decade).
18 1 B. FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 249.
19 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 52-55.
20 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-oper-
ation among the States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(xxv),
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 122, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
21 Resolution on The Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314(xxix), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 31) at 144, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Vol. 17.79
CRIMINAL LAW
mission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, completed in August
1979, is entitled: "International crimes and international delicts." The
first paragraph of section 2 reads as follows:
An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a
State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is
recognized as a crime by that community as a whole, constitutes an
international crime.22
Once again a Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of
Mankind is under active United Nations consideration. What makes this
latter document specifically different from the previously cited instru-
ments is that even though article 2 criminalizes aggression in a similar
fashion, article 1 makes all offenses against the peace and security of
mankind "crimes under international law, for which the responsible indi-
viduals shall be punished. "
2 3
Can there be collective liability and punishment for state conduct
deemed to be criminal under contemporary international law? Most
commentators reject the notion altogether 24 or avoid the issue, 5 but
there are others who tend to be more cautious. Starke, for example, indi-
cates that the evolving notion of state responsibility may eventually "ad-
vance to the stage where States are fixed also with responsibility for
breaches of international law which are 'international crimes', as distinct
from normal responsibility for breaches. . . to make reparation or pay
compensation."2u6 Although Professor Munch allows that penal respon-
sibility of states in international law is not "unthinkable," he also admits
that present attitudes do not indicate any support for this concept. In
fact, he concludes in a rather pessimistic vein that such an approach
"would presuppose a change in the constitution of the community of
22 Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doe. A/34/194 (1979), reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 1557, 1573 (1979).
23 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954) (emphasis added). For the
renewed attempts to draw up an acceptable and meaningful Code, cf. Thiam, Special Rapporteur,
First Report on The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Interna-
tional Law Commission, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/364 (1983); Thiam, Special Rapporteur,
Second Report on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Interna-
tional Law Commission, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/377 (1984); McCaffrey, Current Develop-
ments: The Thirty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 457, 457
(1984).
24 The classic criticism can be found in Schwarzenberger, supra note 1.
25 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 1979) is a typical
example. Ian Brownlie's most recent statement casts further doubt on the traditional view: "Unfor-
tunately, the precise legal incidents of an 'international crime' in respect of states are a matter of
uncertainty." I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY-PART I
33 (1983).
26 J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (8th ed. 1977).
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states . *.". . " What of de facto or de jure outlawry in which either
regional or global peacekeeping organs impose sanctions against states
whose conduct has been proscribed by international agreement? Accord-
ing to Margaret Doxey: "The machinery exists, but the capability and
will to work it are lacking."2 The distinguished political analyst, Ray-
mond Aron, is even less reassuring: "The concrete obligations of inter-
national law cannot be enforced by sanctions: they remain prescriptive,
like morality."' 9
Yet, it is not correct to infer that recent international law has re-
fused to apply a variety of universal moral standards, violations of
which---even when done by states-may be deemed to be criminal. It is
true that Justice Robert Jackson, Chief American Prosecutor at the Nu-
remberg War Crimes Trial, denied that a state could actually commit a
crime, arguing instead that criminality is a personal concept.3" But it is
also true that the victorious allies in both world wars treated the defeated
states as criminal entities. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles as-
signed to Germany and her allies the responsibility for causing a war of
aggression, and by that war guilt made Germany liable for a huge repara-
tion settlement. 31 The Treaty also stripped Germany of her entire colo-
nial possessions in addition to a considerable amount of both territory
and population.32 Thus Germany was subjected to both criminalization
and punishment. She had been declared, ex post facto, an outlaw state
and was not admitted to the community of nations until 1926. It was
necessary, declared French Premier Georges Clemenceau, "to admit in
international law the principle of responsibility which is the basis of do-
mestic law."33
The Nuremberg Judgment, following the Second World War, is an
27 Munch, State Responsibility in International Criminal Law, 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 150, 154 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as M.
Bassiouni & V. Nanda]. See also McCaffrey, supra note 23, at 457, 457-60 (1984), for a description
of the most recent International Law Commission developments relating to state responsibility.
28 M. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 13 (1971). She
reluctantly concludes: "In considering international sanctioning, however, we are looking not at a
simple sequence of law enforcement, but a complicated pattern of political interaction between sov-
ereign states, in which the system is not valued more highly than its component parts." Id. at 138.
Contra, emphasizing the importance of political symbolism, see de Kieffer, The Purpose of Sanctions,
15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 295 (1983).
29 R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 112 (R. Howard
& A. Fox trans. 1967).
30 Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note
1, at 268.
31 Treaty of Peace Between Germany and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, June 28,
1919, Part VIII, sec. 1, 225 Parry's T.S. 189-393.
32 Germany was forced to cede ten percent of its population and thirteen percent of its
territory.
33 P. RENOUVIN, LE TRArrP DE VERSAILLES 93 (1969).
Vol. 17:79
CRIMINAL LAW
even more powerful condemnation of German criminal state conduct:
"To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international
crime: it is the supreme international crime differing only from other
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the
whole.",
3 4
Despite the impossibility of placing the German state in the dock at
Nuremberg, Germany was on trial along with its major war criminals.
There can be no doubt that the allies intended to punish the German
nation as well as its captured leaders. In a letter to the head of the Salva-
tion Army, President Harry Truman left no doubt on this point: "Due
to their barbaric practices, we have a stern duty to teach the German
people that hard lesson that they must change their ways before they can
be received back into the family of peaceful civilized nations."35 Or, to
quote from the Potsdam Protocol of August 2, 1945: "[T]he German
people . .. cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought
upon themselves ... "36 The Yalta Conference meetings, declarations,
and documents are replete with references to the "dismemberment of
Germany," sizeable reparations, and enforced disarmament.37
After careful reflection upon the Versailles and Nuremberg prece-
dents, one cannot avoid the conclusion that if aggression is to be included
in the taxonomy of international crime, then states as well as individuals
must be held to account for their wrongdoing.3" One must also note,
however, that the drafters of the Genocide Convention pulled back from
the notion of state responsibility for genocidal acts. 39 The difficulties of
initiating and developing a meaningful international criminal law, when
dealing with state sponsored or state fostered violations of prevailing
norms, are similar to those relating to the international protection of
human rights. Who bears the penalty for human rights violations? To
be even more precise, what are the penalties? Who is to enforce them,
and where are the mechanisms? One partial answer is the creation of
34 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 186 (1947).
35 Quoted by B. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 47 (1977). See also the direc-
tive of Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, on September 22,
1944: "The German people must be made to understand that all necessary steps will be taken to
guarantee against a third attempt by them to conquer the world." U.S. DEP'T STATE, FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS-THE CONFERENCES AT MALTA AND
YALTA 1945, 143 (1955) [hereinafter cited as YALTA].
36 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, August 2, 1945, part II. A.3.(1)(b)(i).
2 U.S. DEP'T STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS-CON-
FERENCE OF BERLIN 1945, 1502 (1960).
37 YALTA, supra note 35, at 562-825, 968-71, 928-83.
38 Contra Munch, supra note 27, at 154: "What victors do to the vanquished is no proof of
international law."
39 Id. at 148.
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regional systems such as that of the European Community (but even this
structure has loopholes and imperfections). An easier solution for this
particular conundrum is to place aggression back within the realm of
customary international law to be dealt with by existing treaties, conven-
tions, and the U.N. Charter. Penalties or sanctions, if applied by
whatever means, would be political and not criminal. International crim-
inality would then attach only to persons and not entities.
B. Apartheid
The "crime" of apartheid presents similar difficulties. A customary
norm may have indeed developed proscribing all forms of racial discrimi-
nation," but the definition offered by the International Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheida" is not only
vague and overbroad, but duplicates in broad measure proscriptions al-
ready contained in other international instruments. Article II seeks to
prohibit in sweeping terminology conduct described in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),42 the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), a" and the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.'
Moreover, article III of the Apartheid Convention which designates "in-
ternational criminal responsibility," 5 is not altogether clear as to sub-
jects of its application, whether they be individuals, groups, governments,
or an entire people. Apartheid is declared to be "a crime against human-
ity,' 4 6 but as Professor Jankovic observed about the Nuremberg War
Crimes Trials, how does one place an entire nation in the dock?47 The
Apartheid Convention specifically denounces the racial segregation and
discriminatory practices of South Africa, without clarifying how they
will be analogized to other states and cultures. Finally, there is the per-
petual complication-as with all human rights issues short of peremp-
tory norms-of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.48
Professors Bassiouni and Derby have proposed the creation of an
international criminal court to exercise jurisdiction over crimes of
40 See Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions in the International Sports Arena, 15 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 329, 335 (1983) (hints that racism and apartheid may be prohibited by thejus cogens). An
intensive analysis of the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is provided by
N. LEARNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RAcIAL Dis-
CRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (1970).
41 G.A. Res. 3068 (xxvii), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
42 G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
43 Id. at 49.
44 Genocide Convention, supra note 8.
45 See G.A. Res 3068 (xxvii), supra note 41, at 76.
46 Id. at 75.
47 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, supra note 19.
48 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
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apartheid.49 Individuals, groups, organizations, and apparently states are
subject to conviction and penalty,50 but in addition to the problems pre-
viously mentioned, the likelihood of an apartheid court is even less fore-
seeable than that of an international criminal court, or for that matter a
genocide court. The best approach to racial discrimination on the inter-
national level is to deal with malfeasing governments by invoking the
traditional punitive modalities of customary international law and those
prescriptive measures which are permitted by the United Nations Char-
ter. It should not be forgotten that at present no western state has rati-
fied the Apartheid Convention.
C. Genocide
If the prohibition of genocidal activities has become part of thejus
cogens as the drafters of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
seemed to imply," l then why has there been absolutely no interest in cre-
ating a genocide court, as provided for in article VI of the Genocide Con-
vention? 2 For that matter, given the rampant genocidal activities which
have been carried on throughout the globe since the drafting of the Ge-
nocide Convention, one could just as easily argue that genocide itself has
become a peremptory norm!53 On this critical human rights question the
world community seems to have relegated the Nuremberg Judgment to
the status of a legal anomaly and an historical oddity. If the world can-
not prevent genocide from occurring on a widespread scale, how will it
be able to effectively sanction apartheid or racial discrimination?
Throughout the post-charter decades, the writings of publicists have
in the main treated the aforementioned conduct, often engaged in by
states, as criminal acts, though matters of jurisdiction, process, and pun-
ishment have never been authoritatively settled. Treaty, convention, cus-
tomary practice, and the opinio juris, however, have treated individuals
as the proper subjects of international criminality. Pirates and piracy, for
example, have long been considered hostes humani generis and subject to
municipal apprehension and jurisdiction. 4 So-called aerial piracy, a
49 Bassiouni & Derby, Final Report on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International Instruments, 9
HOFSTRA L. REv. 523 (1981).
50 Id. at 540, 549.
51 Edwards, Contributions of the Genocide Convention to the Development of International Law,
8 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 300, 305-06 (1981).
52 See Genocide Convention, supra note 8.
53 Cf L. KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1982);
Leiser, Victims of Genocide, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 315 (1981).
54 Cf. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); Sundberg, Piracy: Air and Sea, in I N. Bassiouni & V. Nanda, supra note 27,
at 455-68; Rubin, Is Piracy Illegal?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1976).
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term that has engendered some academic dispute55-a better view is that




Although Whiteman insists that political terrorism on an interna-
tional level is proscribed by the jus cogens,57 the Bassiouni Code quite
properly refrains from including terrorism on its list of international
criminal acts.58 On the one hand, it is discomforting that at this point in
time the world community still cannot agree upon a mode of identifica-
tion or a means of controlling international terrorism.5 9 On the other
hand, there is really no need for a special category of terrorist offenses
since terrorism consists of acts universally condemned as common crimes
by every civilized society.60
Without a body of international legislation, and absent codification
by treaty or convention, the only way to ascertain international criminal-
ity is to apply existing international instruments which prohibit and pe-
nalize such conduct. It also has the added advantage of placing an
emphasis upon voluntary compliance, particularly through the concept
of pacta sunt servanda.61 Utilizing a strict documentary focus, Dr.
Farooq Hassan refers to eight purely individual criminal acts of an inter-
national character.62 The Bassiouni Code lists twenty forms of wrongful
conduct, but does not distinguish between types of actors who may be
involved in the proposed substantive crimes.63 Consolidation, rationali-
55 See Van Pantiuys, Aircraft Hijacking and International Law, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNATVL L. 1,
4-12 (1970); Shubber, Is Hiacking of Aircraft Piracy in International Law?, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
193 (1968-1969).
56 Tokyo Convention of Offenses Committed on Board Aircraft, September, 1963; The Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December, 1970; Montreal Conven-
tion on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, September, 1971;
reprinted in 2 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CON-
TROL 1-7, 101-05, 107-12 (1979).
57 Whiteman, 'Jus Cogens' in International Law with a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 609, 625 (1977). Terrorism is ranked fourth on her list, proceeded by piracy.
58 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 49-51.
59 See Murphy, Legal Controls and the Deterrence of Terrorism: Performance and Prospects, 13
RUTGERS L.J. 465 (1982); Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: Recent Developments, 13
RUTGERS L. REv. 493, 493-511 (1982).
60 See generally R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE: ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL
(1983).
61 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
62 Hassan, The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 39, 58 (1983). He also indentifies six other international crimes related to state and
governmental conduct.
63 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 49-106.
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zation, and minimization of prohibited acts must inevitably be the most
effective technique of juridical construction. A narrow and restrictive
approach to the nature of international criminality enhances the possibil-
ity of resolving the direct control dilemma. This type of analysis pro-
vides a stark contrast with the uncertain vision offered by the
international protection of human rights. Creating, redefining, and en-
larging the ever increasing number of human rights claims have inhibited
rather than facilitated human rights guarantees." 4 There is a major les-
son to be drawn from past experience.
Despite these difficulties, one must concede cooperation and agree-
ment in certain areas. Efforts to prohibit slavery and narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances are two examples of some degree of global com-
mon enterprise.65 Yet, it may very well be as Professor Green suggests
that regional systems of proscription and enforcement are the most real-
istic hope for the future rather than the development of universal en-
forcement models.66 Even so, problems relating to the application of the
European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism67 likewise raise
doubts about regional arrangements, especially when the signatory par-
ties are not truly in accord.68 Although extradition continues to provide
the major mode of enforcement in both the European Community and
the larger world arena with respect to terrorism and political crimes, the
record is not encouraging. 9
III. CONCLUSION
Whether there is in fact, as opposed to theory, a truly international
criminal law, mutual assistance in criminal matters-including rendition,
transfers of prisoners, and exchange of information-does exist. Profes-
sor Mueller argues that we are presently in "a twilight zone between no
international criminal law and a fully-developed international criminal
law. . ."10 Dr. Schwarzenberger has not changed his position that the
idea of substantive international criminal law is a legal fiction.71 But sys-
64 Friedlander, Human Rights Theory and NGO Practice: Where Do We Go From Here?, in
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO STRATEGIES
219-27 (V. Nanda, J. Scarritt, & G. Shepherd Jr. eds. 1981).
65 See M. BASSIOuNI, supra note 10, at 80, 95-96.
66 Green, Is There an International Criminal Law?, 21 ALBERTA L. REv. 251, 261 (1983).
67 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27 Jan. 1977, ETS No. 90.
65 Friedlander, supra note 59, at 500-01; see also Shupilov, Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases
and Some Important Questions of Extradition, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 127 (1983).
69 Friedlander, supra note 59, at 499-505.
70 Mueller, supra note 15, at 2.
71 See Friedlander, The Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present-Day Inquiry, 15
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 13 (1983).
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tems of enforcement are often structured as multi-tiered mechanisms
which become complex only in advanced stages of development.
Traditional Anglo-American perspectives see the whole as greater
than the sum of all its parts. Perhaps the best way to fashion a successful
model of international criminal law and enforcement is to deal with each
part on a separate and distinct basis. As with jigsaw puzzles, the end
product is not complete until all the pieces fit together. If the advocates
of an international criminal system concentrate on perfecting each piece
of the overall puzzle, the final result may surprise and suffice.
The civilized world cannot afford to avoid the growing menace of
world criminality much longer. There must soon be an answer to Word-
sworth's query:
Wither is fled the visionary gleam?
Where is it now, the glory and the dream?
72
72 W. WORDSWORTH, Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollection of Early Child-
hood, IV, 21:22 (1806).
